Power in plurality voting games

DOI10.1007/S11238-025-10053-ZMaRDI QIDQ6920730zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors René van den Brink, Dinko Dimitrov, Agnieszka Rusinowska

Publication date 6 October 2025

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S11238-025-10053-Z

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatizationplurality voting gamepower indexwinning coalition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites work

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• N‐person games in partition function form
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• Power indices for multicandidate voting games
• Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
• The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure
• The Myerson value for union stable structures
• Values of games in partition function form
• Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies

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