What logical pluralism cannot be
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Publication:484956
DOI10.1007/S11229-013-0333-XzbMATH Open1318.03014OpenAlexW2002502050MaRDI QIDQ484956FDOQ484956
Authors: Rosanna Keefe 
Publication date: 8 January 2015
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0333-x
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Cited In (26)
- Logical pluralism and logical form
- PLURALISM IN LOGIC
- Counterlogicals as counterconventionals
- Pluralistic perspectives on logic: an introduction
- Should pluralists be pluralists about pluralism?
- A hierarchy of classical and paraconsistent logics
- Metalinguistic negotiation and logical pluralism
- Some remarks on logical realism and logical pluralism
- (Meta)inferential levels of entailment beyond the Tarskian paradigm
- Logical pluralism
- Logical pluralism: another application for chunk and permeate
- Restall and Beall on logical pluralism: a critique
- From natural to formal language: a case for logical pluralism
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A dialogical route to logical pluralism
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Logical pluralism without the normativity
- Limiting logical pluralism
- Substructural logics, pluralism and collapse
- Metalogical pluralism and universal logic
- Why logical pluralism?
- On when a disjunction is informative. Ambiguous connectives and a realist commitment to pluralism
- Restall's proof-theoretic pluralism and relevance logic
- The collapse of logical pluralism has been greatly exaggerated
- Problems for logical pluralism
- Alethic pluralism and logical consequence
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