Regularity and Stability of Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games

DOI10.1287/MOOR.6.4.530MaRDI QIDQ3960495zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors M. J. M. Jansen

Publication date 1981

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.4.530

zbMATH Keywords

completely mixed bimatrix gamesmaximal Nash subsetregular equilibrium pointsregularitystability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cited in

(21)

• Regular equilibrium points of bimatrix games
• Perturbation theory of completely mixed bimatrix games
• Equilibrium points in special n-person games
• A theorem on the number of Nash equilibria in a bimatrix game
• Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
• Tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium
• A generalization of the Nash equilibrium theorem on bimatrix games
• A note on polymatrix games
• A bound on the number of Nash equilibria in a coordination game.
• On proper refinement of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games
• Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining
• Game dynamics and Nash equilibria
• Zero-sum two person games
• On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria
• Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players
• Evolutionarily stable strategy in asymmetric games: dynamical and information-theoretical perspectives
• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
• Strictly perfect equilibrium points of bimatrix games
• A generalization of an oddness-theorem for bimatrix games
• Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium points in bimatrix games
• Is having a unique equilibrium robust?

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