Risk taking in selection contests
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(19)- The effect of competition on risk taking in contests
- How tournament incentives affect asset markets: a comparison between winner-take-all tournaments and elimination contests
- Optimally biased Tullock contests
- Biased contests for symmetric players
- Banks, relative performance, and sequential contagion
- Contingent payments in selection contests
- An envelope approach to tournament design
- Modifying Variability and Correlations in Winner-Take-All Contests
- Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes
- Degree of difficulty as the objective of contest design
- Optimally biased contests with draws
- Submission costs in risk-taking contests
- Selectivity in hierarchical social systems
- Hierarchies and promotions in political institutions: accountability and selection
- Strategic choice of variability in multiround contests and contests with handicaps
- On the optimal design of all-pay auctions
- Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps
- Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players
- The selection efficiency of tournaments
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