Stable extensive game forms with perfect information
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(10)- A local theory of cooperative games
- Core implementation via dynamic game forms
- Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
- Exact stability and its applications to strong solvability
- Nash and strongly consistent two-player game forms
- COMPROMISING IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES AND COOPERATION IN PERFECT EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES
- A note of tight extensive game forms
- Strongly consistent game forms
- Rectangularity and tightness: A normal form characterization of perfect information extensive game forms
- Stable cores in information graph games
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