Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued.

DOI10.1007/S100580200076MaRDI QIDQ1862644zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lars Ehlers

Publication date 15 July 2003

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200076

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Group preferences (91B10) Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18)

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Cited in

(7)

• Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
• Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
• Single-basined choice
• Single-plateaued choice
• Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness
• Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
• Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences

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