Using ultimatum power as a leverage in resolving a bargaining conflict
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Cites work
- (In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games
- A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems
- An arbitration game and the egalitarian bargaining solution
- An evolutionary model of bargaining
- An implementation of the Nash bargaining solution by iterated strict dominance
- Bargaining with revoking costs
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Divide the dollar: Three solutions and extensions
- Divide-the-dollar game revisited
- Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games
- Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat
- Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
- Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
- Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games
- Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems
- Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash demand game
- Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium
- Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
- The bargaining problem
- Two-person bargaining: An experimental test of the Nash axioms
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
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