Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies
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Publication:1178809
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90104-CzbMath0739.90077OpenAlexW2032069030MaRDI QIDQ1178809
Publication date: 26 June 1992
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90104-c
correlated equilibriumgames with incomplete informationconvergent sequence of gamesupperhemicontinuity
Related Items (15)
Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games ⋮ Random-player games ⋮ Type correlated equilibria for games with payoff uncertainty ⋮ Existence of equilibria in countable games: an algebraic approach ⋮ On the approximate purification of mixed strategies in games with infinite action sets ⋮ The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games ⋮ A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games ⋮ Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence ⋮ Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games ⋮ Correlated equilibrium existence for infinite games with type-dependent strategies ⋮ Balance and discontinuities in infinite games with type-dependent strategies ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction ⋮ Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information ⋮ Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information ⋮ Calibration and Bayesian learning.
Cites Work
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- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Similarity of information and behavior with a pointwise convergence topology
- Similarity of games with incomplete information
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Existence of Correlated Equilibria
- Equiconvergence of Martingales
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