Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium

DOI10.1016/S0004-3702(01)00132-1zbMath0983.68237MaRDI QIDQ5958637

Kate Larson, Tuomas W. Sandholm

Publication date: 3 March 2002

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0004-3702(01)00132-1

zbMATH Keywords

game theory; bargaining; bounded rationality; automated negotiation; multiagent systems; resource-bounded reasoning; anytime algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68W05: Nonnumerical algorithms

Related Items

Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium, Auction design with costly preference elicitation, Algorithmic rationality: game theory with costly computation, Computer science and decision theory

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