Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2016.02.053zbMath1346.90046OpenAlexW2302223201MaRDI QIDQ323245

Knut Richter, Grigory Pishchulov

Publication date: 7 October 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/optimal-contract-design-in-the-joint-economic-lot-size-problem-with-multidimensional-asymmetric-information(dfb3b7be-c434-4440-ae4c-89b5b1bc4903).html

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationnonlinear programmingsupply chain coordination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Nonlinear programming (90C30) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

Outsource planning with asymmetric supply cost information through a menu of option contracts ⋮ Supply chain coordination under asymmetric information and partial vertical integration ⋮ Information sharing through digitalisation in decentralised supply chains ⋮ On explicit solutions of a two-echelon supply chain coordination game ⋮ Coordination of a two-level supply chain with contracts

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