Selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate both first-order and second-order social dilemma
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Publication:485662
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2014.07.021zbMath1302.91023arXiv1408.2610OpenAlexW2963507048WikidataQ47836673 ScholiaQ47836673MaRDI QIDQ485662
Publication date: 13 January 2015
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.2610
Related Items (7)
Heterogeneity reproductive ability promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Small world can alleviate the social dilemmas originating from self-regulation or community policing issues ⋮ Spontaneous punishment promotes cooperation in public good game ⋮ Promoting cooperation by punishing minority ⋮ Mutual punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial public goods game ⋮ Evolutionary potential games on lattices ⋮ Sanctions triggered by jealousy help promote the cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
Cites Work
- Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
- Strategy abundance in \(2\times 2\) games for arbitrary mutation rates
- Invasion and expansion of cooperators in lattice populations: prisoner's dilemma vs. snowdrift games
- Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation
- Evolutionary stability on graphs
- The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
- The replicator equation on graphs
- Selfish punishment: altruism can be maintained by competition among cheaters
- Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
- Environmental versus demographic variability in stochastic predator–prey models
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