Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines
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Publication:495756
DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0446-6zbMath1388.91110OpenAlexW2070875706MaRDI QIDQ495756
Publication date: 15 September 2015
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0446-6
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (2)
Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines ⋮ The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management
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