Influence functions, followers and command games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.003zbMath1236.91021MaRDI QIDQ536083

Agnieszka Rusinowska, Michel Grabisch

Publication date: 16 May 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.003

zbMATH Keywords

influence function; kernel; command function; command game; follower function; lower and upper inverses; minimal sets generating a command game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

Lattices in Social Networks with Influence, From observable behaviors to structures of interaction in binary games of strategic complements, A model of influence based on aggregation functions, A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions, Opinion dynamics and wisdom under conformity, Game theoretic interaction and decision: a quantum analysis, Values for Markovian coalition processes, Anonymous social influence, Indirect control and power in mutual control structures, Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games, A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations

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