A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.08.003zbMath1200.91119OpenAlexW2189049416MaRDI QIDQ607262

Stergios Athanassoglou, Jay Sethuraman, Steven J. Brams

Publication date: 19 November 2010

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

double auctionpartnership dissolutionex-post efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

On the dissolution of three-party partnerships via a buy-sell mechanism ⋮ Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values ⋮ Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
• Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
• Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
• Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
• Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
• Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
• Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Incentives in Teams

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