Markov perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.09.003zbMath1232.91019MaRDI QIDQ617615

Hans H. Haller, Roger D. Lagunoff

Publication date: 21 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.09.003

zbMATH Keywords

repeated games; stochastic games; Markov perfect equilibria; genericity; alternating moves; asynchronous choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games

Related Items

Dynamic pricing with uncertain production cost: an alternating-move approach, Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria, Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining

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