On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games
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Publication:647483
DOI10.1007/s00224-010-9282-7zbMath1278.91012OpenAlexW4240401627MaRDI QIDQ647483
Felix Fischer, Markus Brill, Paul Harrenstein, Felix Brandt
Publication date: 23 November 2011
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-010-9282-7
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)
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Cites Work
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