Evolutionary inspection and corruption games

DOI10.3390/G7040031zbMath1406.91039OpenAlexW2535661644MaRDI QIDQ725050

Stamatios Katsikas, Wei Yang, Vassili N. Kolokol'tsov

Publication date: 1 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040031

zbMATH Keywords

noncooperative gameevolutionary gamedynamic gameinspection gamecorruption gameinspection budgetmultiple inspecteesmultiple violation levelspunishment fine

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Dynamic games (91A25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (6)

Corruption and botnet defense: a mean field game approach ⋮ A Stackelberg game for the Italian tax evasion problem ⋮ Evolutionary, mean-field and pressure-resistance game modelling of networks security ⋮ A sequential Stackelberg game for dynamic inspection problems ⋮ Revisiting inspection game and inspector leadership through reaction networks ⋮ A polynomial-time method to compute all Nash equilibria solutions of a general two-person inspection game

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