Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(91)90037-RzbMath0734.90003MaRDI QIDQ811308

Yongsheng Xu, Nick Baigent

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

axiomsplurality votingchoice aggregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (14)

Approval voting on dichotomous preferences ⋮ Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal ⋮ Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting ⋮ Weighted approval voting ⋮ A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives ⋮ Majority rule on \(j\)-rich ballot spaces ⋮ Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences ⋮ The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization ⋮ Size approval voting ⋮ Collective Choice for Simple Preferences ⋮ Axiomatizations of Approval Voting ⋮ Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences ⋮ Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations ⋮ Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem

Cites Work

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• Choice functions over a finite set: A summary
• New problems in the general choice theory
• A non-dictatorial compromise
• Competitive Stability under Weak Gross Substitutability: The "Euclidean Distance" Approach
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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