The evolution of cooperative strategies for asymmetric social interactions

DOI10.1007/s11238-005-6014-6zbMath1098.91018OpenAlexW2135399625MaRDI QIDQ850474

Peter M. Todd, Jörg Rieskamp

Publication date: 3 November 2006

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-6014-6

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesbargainingfinite state automatainvestment gameevolutionary stable strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

The effects of open innovation platform knowledge strategies on participants: evolutionary game research

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Learning to cooperate with Pavlov and adaptive strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma with noise
• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
• Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games
• Cooperation in the short and in the long run
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Behaviorism, finite automata, and stimulus response theory
• Evolutionary equilibria: Characterization theorems and their implications
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Commitment versus discretion in the peasant-dictator game
• The independent localisations of interaction and learning in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Stimulus-response theory of inite automata
• The Inapplicability of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Evolutionarily stable co-operative commitments
• The ecology of cooperation

This page was built for publication: The evolution of cooperative strategies for asymmetric social interactions