Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0146-7zbMath1142.91422MaRDI QIDQ857978

Vincent Anesi

Publication date: 5 January 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0146-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B12: Voting theory

Related Items

Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets), Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria, Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy, Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games, Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution, Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions, A new old solution for weak tournaments, Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games

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