Symmetric majority rules

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.04.002zbMATH Open1331.91067arXiv1503.04028OpenAlexW2037174887MaRDI QIDQ898759FDOQ898759

Daniela Bubboloni, Michele Gori

Publication date: 18 December 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we study the rules which satisfy suitable symmetries and obey the majority principle. In particular, supposing that individuals and alternatives are exogenously partitioned into subcommittees and subclasses, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of reversal symmetric majority rules that are anonymous and neutral with respect to the considered partitions. We also determine a general method for constructing and counting those rules and we explicitly apply it to some simple cases.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1503.04028

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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Cited In (9)

• On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence
• Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom
• Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
• Breaking ties in collective decision-making
• Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
• Signatures of indirect majority systems
• Combinatorics of Election Scores
• Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
• The flow network method

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