Subjective evaluations of n-person games
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Publication:909591
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90007-7zbMath0694.90103OpenAlexW2065233020MaRDI QIDQ909591
Douglas H. Blair, Richard P. McLean
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90007-7
subjective expected utilitysimple gamesaxiomatizationprobabilistic valuesemi-valuesShapley and Banzhaf values
Related Items (3)
Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom ⋮ The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity ⋮ SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER
Cites Work
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- Utility functions for simple games
- On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
- Semivalues of Simple Games
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
- Citizen Voting Power Under the Electoral College: A Stochastic Model Based on State Voting Patterns
- Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
- A Mixture-Set Axiomatization of Conditional Subjective Expected Utility
- An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable Utility
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