Characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs of inertia supergames

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90056-PzbMath0705.90105MaRDI QIDQ918449

Subir K. Chakrabarti

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

correlated \(\alpha \) -coreI-sustainable payoffinertia supergameone-shot gamestrong, perfect equilibrium points

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Switching costs in infinitely repeated games ⋮ Switching costs in frequently repeated games. ⋮ Finite complexity and the folk theorem in repeated games

Cites Work

• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Acceptable points in games of perfect information
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria

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