Granny versus game theorist: Ambiguity in experimental games

DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9053-3zbMath1136.91306OpenAlexW2145555827WikidataQ57924130 ScholiaQ57924130MaRDI QIDQ928752

David Kelsey, Burkhard C. Schipper, Jürgen Eichberger

Publication date: 11 June 2008

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/rails/active_storage/blobs/eyJfcmFpbHMiOnsibWVzc2FnZSI6IkJBaHBWdz09IiwiZXhwIjpudWxsLCJwdXIiOiJibG9iX2lkIn19--c3da7f3a675d46c2ba6c07386bf192afd6904798/06-27.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsChoquet expected utilityKnightian uncertaintystrategic uncertaintyequilibrium under ambiguity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Utility theory for games (91A30)

Related Items

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Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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