Type two computability of social choice functions and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in an infinite society
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Publication:990505
DOI10.1016/j.amc.2007.02.130zbMath1193.91051OpenAlexW2049346398MaRDI QIDQ990505
Publication date: 1 September 2010
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2007.02.130
strategy-proofnesssocial choice functiondictatorinfinite societythe gibbard-satterthwaite theoremtype two computability
Related Items
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem of social choice theory in an infinite society and LPO (limited principle of omniscience), The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
Cites Work
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