Equilibrium play and best response to (stated) beliefs in normal form games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.03.003zbMath1156.91331OpenAlexW2117928113MaRDI QIDQ1007779

Pedro Rey-Biel

Publication date: 24 March 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsnormal form gamesconstant sum gamesK-level reasoningstated beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Introduction to experimental game theory
• Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games.
• A model of noisy introspection.
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games