On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.006zbMath1159.91373OpenAlexW2036930562MaRDI QIDQ1017798

Paulo Barelli

Publication date: 12 May 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.006

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcommon knowledgefull surplus extractionuniversal beliefs space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces ⋮ Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types ⋮ Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design ⋮ The genericity of beliefs-determine-preferences models revisited ⋮ Full surplus extraction from samples ⋮ Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces

Cites Work

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• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Continuity in auction design
• Attractors of iterated function systems and Markov operators
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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