Choosing from a large tournament

DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0279-3zbMath1163.91345OpenAlexW2134014252MaRDI QIDQ1024772

Mark Fey

Publication date: 17 June 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0279-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (9)

Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament? ⋮ Computing minimal extending sets by relation-algebraic modeling and development ⋮ The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting ⋮ On the structure of stable tournament solutions ⋮ The minimal covering set in large tournaments ⋮ On the Discriminative Power of Tournament Solutions ⋮ Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments ⋮ Margin of victory for tournament solutions ⋮ Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments

Cites Work

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• Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison
• Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation
• A Random Voting Graph Almost Surely has a Hamiltonian Cycle when the Number of Alternatives is Large
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• A Measure of Asymptotic Efficiency for Tests of a Hypothesis Based on the sum of Observations

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