Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90003-8zbMath0664.90101OpenAlexW2038210926MaRDI QIDQ1115823

Daniel F. Spulber

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90003-8

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationbargainingincomplete informationincentive compatibilitydirect revelation gamerate regulation process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Trade models (91B60)

Related Items (4)

Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship ⋮ Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply ⋮ Efficient allocation with continuous quantities ⋮ Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Bilateral contracts
• Bilateral monopoly with imperfect information
• Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply
• On the design of regulatory price adjustment mechanisms
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information and Bilateral Contracts
• Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information
• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Multi-Product Quantity-Dependent Prices and Profitability Constraints
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

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