Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90112-9zbMath0673.90105OpenAlexW2060266983MaRDI QIDQ1121187

Tilman Börgers

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90112-9

zbMATH Keywords

perfect equilibriaapproximation procedureinfinite horizon gamefinite truncated gamesn-person infinite multi-stage gamesperfect \(\epsilon \) -equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games ⋮ Dominated strategies and common knowledge ⋮ ON GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION: EQUILIBRIA, ε–EQUILIBRIA AND APPROXIMATION BY SIMPLE GAMES ⋮ Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria ⋮ Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria ⋮ Markov perfect equilibrium existence for a class of undiscounted infinite-horizon dynamic games ⋮ Upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes

Cites Work

• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information