A noncooperative justification for egalitarian surplus sharing
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Publication:1121753
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(89)90055-3zbMath0674.90004OpenAlexW1988507822MaRDI QIDQ1121753
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(89)90055-3
egalitarian surplus sharinggroup of agentsnoncooperative justificationnoncooperative Nash equilibria
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