Coalition formation in simple games with dominant players

DOI10.1007/BF01770068zbMath0454.90097OpenAlexW2008042549MaRDI QIDQ1149892

Bezalel Peleg

Publication date: 1981

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01770068

zbMATH Keywords

simple gamescoalition formationdominant playersEuropean parliamentsstrict majoritytown councils in Israel

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (17)

Coalitional desirability and the equal division value ⋮ Simple games and magic squares ⋮ Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values ⋮ Large symmetric games are characterized by completeness of the desirability relation ⋮ Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory ⋮ On the use of binary decision diagrams for solving problems on simple games ⋮ Stable governments and the semistrict core ⋮ A relation-algebraic approach to simple games ⋮ On the enumeration of some inequivalent monotone Boolean functions ⋮ Characterization of coalitionally ordered games ⋮ Existence of Dominant Players and their Role in the Formation of a Cabinet Coalition ⋮ A consensus model of political decision-making ⋮ An alternative model of the formation of political coalitions ⋮ A complete classification of equational classes of threshold functions included in clones ⋮ A note on the equal division kernel and the α‐power model ⋮ On connected coalitions in dominated simple games ⋮ The desirability relation of simple games

Cites Work

• A theory of coalition formation in committees
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• A Method for Computing the Kernel of n-Person Games
• On the Enumeration of Majority Games
• The Structure of the Kernel of a Cooperative Game
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

This page was built for publication: Coalition formation in simple games with dominant players