Dominated strategies and common knowledge

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90020-SzbMath0749.90092MaRDI QIDQ1189705

Larry Samuelson

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledge; admissibility; dominated strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

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