Minimizing the mean majority deficit: The second square-root rule

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00011-0zbMath0953.91005OpenAlexW2161740398MaRDI QIDQ1296507

Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover

Publication date: 1 February 2001

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(98)00011-0

zbMATH Keywords

Banzhaf power indexequal suffragemajoritarianismmean majority deficitsimple voting gamesquare-root rulestwo-tier decision-making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (9)

Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union ⋮ Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule ⋮ Welfare ordering of voting weight allocations ⋮ A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting ⋮ Gerrymander-proof representative democracies ⋮ Voting and Power ⋮ Square Root Voting System, Optimal Threshold and $$ \uppi $$ π ⋮ Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives ⋮ Collective bias models in two-tier voting systems and the democracy deficit

Cites Work

• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Unnamed Item

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