Optimal multilateral contracts
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Publication:1341481
DOI10.1007/BF01221199zbMath0815.90047MaRDI QIDQ1341481
Stefan Krasa, Anne P. Villamil
Publication date: 5 January 1995
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (11)
The equilibrium allocation of investment capital in the presence of adverse selection and costly state verification ⋮ Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide ⋮ A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization ⋮ Interbank borrowing and lending between financially constrained banks ⋮ Multi-firm voluntary disclosures for correlated operations ⋮ Sorting the good guys from bad: on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition ⋮ Do lack of transparency and enforcement undermine international risk-sharing? ⋮ Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and with infinitely many commodities ⋮ Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement ⋮ The sound of silence: equilibrium filtering and optimal censoring in financial markets ⋮ Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries
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- The equilibrium allocation of investment capital in the presence of adverse selection and costly state verification
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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