Sequentially optimal auctions

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0529zbMath0872.90030OpenAlexW2001850482MaRDI QIDQ1357405

R. Preston McAfee, Daniel R. Vincent

Publication date: 10 June 1997

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1104.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

reserve priceoptimal static auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (15)

Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions ⋮ Flexible Bayesian analysis of first price auctions using a simulated likelihood ⋮ Sequential auctions, price trends, and risk preferences ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ Optimal auction design under non-commitment ⋮ Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment ⋮ A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand ⋮ Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment ⋮ Optimal fees in internet auctions ⋮ Reserve prices in repeated auctions ⋮ Ordering sellers in sequential auctions ⋮ Coasian dynamics in repeated English auctions ⋮ The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle ⋮ Commitment in sequential auctioning: Advance listings and threshold prices ⋮ Sequential auctions with decreasing reserve prices

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
• The declining price anomaly
• Bidding off the wall: Why reserve prices may be kept secret
• Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
• Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers

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