Repeated large games with incomplete information

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0522zbMath0889.90175OpenAlexW1965764544MaRDI QIDQ1367683

Rann Smorodinsky, Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 4 June 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0522

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (7)

Social learning in recurring games ⋮ Reputation versus social learning ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence to Nash equilibrium: The almost absolute continuity hypothesis ⋮ Limits to rational learning ⋮ Learning, rare events, and recurrent market crashes in frictionless economies without intrinsic uncertainty ⋮ Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information ⋮ Relative entropy in sequential decision problems

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