Games of incomplete information, ergodic theory, and the measurability of equilibria

DOI10.1007/BF02783420zbMath1126.91010OpenAlexW2044824746MaRDI QIDQ1425642

Robert Samuel Simon

Publication date: 17 March 2004

Published in: Israel Journal of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02783420

zbMATH Keywords

sequence spacesnon-measurable setsBayesian equilibriabelief spaces

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (18)

A Bayesian game without \(\epsilon\)-equilibria ⋮ Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information ⋮ On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information ⋮ Equilibria Existence in Bayesian Games: Climbing the Countable Borel Equivalence Relation Hierarchy ⋮ Value‐based distance between information structures ⋮ A game with no Bayesian approximate equilibria ⋮ Invariance to representation of information ⋮ Equilibrium existence in games with a concave Bayesian potential ⋮ Pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games ⋮ Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability ⋮ Stochastic games ⋮ The context of the game ⋮ Correlated equilibrium existence for infinite games with type-dependent strategies ⋮ Balance and discontinuities in infinite games with type-dependent strategies ⋮ Robust equilibria under non-common priors ⋮ On games without approximate equilibria ⋮ Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information ⋮ Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On general minimax theorems
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• A model of set-theory in which every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable
• On von Neumann's minimax theorem
• A 2-Person Game with Lack of Information on 1½ Sides
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

This page was built for publication: Games of incomplete information, ergodic theory, and the measurability of equilibria