An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00042-3zbMath1069.91010WikidataQ57944694 ScholiaQ57944694MaRDI QIDQ1420516

Zvi Safra, Dov Samet

Publication date: 2 February 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Bargaining solutionsOrdinal utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule ⋮ Bargaining with ordinal and cardinal players ⋮ Nash bargaining in ordinal environments ⋮ A logic-based axiomatic model of bargaining ⋮ A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule ⋮ The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets ⋮ An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments ⋮ A family of ordinal solutions to bargaining problems with many players ⋮ Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: an axiomatic approach

Cites Work

• Theorems on closed coverings of a simplex and their applications to cooperative game theory
• A note on ordinally equivalent Pareto surfaces
• A family of ordinal solutions to bargaining problems with many players
• The Bargaining Problem
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
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