Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules

DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1115-7zbMath1417.91184arXiv1610.02787OpenAlexW2530848721MaRDI QIDQ1616759

Arkadii M. Slinko, Dodge Cahan

Publication date: 7 November 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.02787

zbMATH Keywords

best-worst voting rulesHotelling-Downs spatial election modelmulti-candidate pure-strategy equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (4)

Axiomatic characterisations of the basic best-worst rule ⋮ Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants ⋮ Spatial competition on 2-dimensional markets and networks when consumers don't always go to the closest firm ⋮ Equilibria on a circular market when consumers do not always buy from the closest firm

Cites Work

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• Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
• Some probabilistic models of best, worst, and best --- worst choices
• When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
• Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition

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