The effects of excluding coalitions

DOI10.3390/g9010001zbMath1401.91023OpenAlexW2781823667MaRDI QIDQ1651860

Tobias Hiller

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010001

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecooperative game theory\(\varphi^E\) valueexcluded coalitionsquarreling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (1)

Measuring players' importance in basketball using the generalized Shapley value

Cites Work

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