Ambiguous persuasion
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Publication:1757548
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.008zbMath1419.91206MaRDI QIDQ1757548
Ming Li, Jian Li, Dorian Beauchêne
Publication date: 15 January 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/984688/1/Li%202018.pdf
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