A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem

DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0245-7zbMath1090.91058OpenAlexW2115051526MaRDI QIDQ1762856

Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

Publication date: 11 February 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143787

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods ⋮ Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems ⋮ Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains ⋮ Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies ⋮ Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule ⋮ On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions ⋮ An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems ⋮ A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model ⋮ A characterization of the plurality rule ⋮ Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria

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