A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games
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Publication:1820997
DOI10.1007/BF00433534zbMath0615.90017OpenAlexW1997197424MaRDI QIDQ1820997
Eric E. C. van Damme, Güth, Werner
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00433534
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Related Items (10)
Dissolving a partnership dynamically ⋮ Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer ⋮ Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale ⋮ Partnership dissolution and proprietary information ⋮ Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information ⋮ An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games ⋮ Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: An axiomatic approach ⋮ On ring formation in auctions ⋮ Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of Knaster's fair division procedure
Cites Work
- Fair division with indivisible commodities
- Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: An axiomatic approach
- The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Auction Design
- A Game of Fair Division
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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