The evolution of social and economic networks.
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Publication:1867528
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2903zbMath1099.91543MaRDI QIDQ1867528
Alison Watts, Matthew O. Jackson
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2903
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