Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
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Publication:1885433
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.002zbMath1077.91006OpenAlexW2081328787MaRDI QIDQ1885433
Publication date: 28 October 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.002
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Dynamic interactive epistemology, Logics of Rational Interaction, AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I: Definition and properties, Limited focus in dynamic games, Stit semantics for epistemic notions based on information disclosure in interactive settings, Thompson transformations for IF-logic, Merging frameworks for interaction, Temporal Aspects of the Dynamics of Knowledge
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