A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms
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Publication:1949759
DOI10.1007/s00453-012-9634-6zbMath1262.68044MaRDI QIDQ1949759
Angelina Vidali, Elias Koutsoupias
Publication date: 16 May 2013
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-012-9634-6
lower bound; mechanism design; algorithmic game theory; dominant strategies; truthful; scheduling unrelated machines; multiparameter mechanism design
68M20: Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems
68Q17: Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.)
91A90: Experimental studies
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