Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2018.11.029zbMath1429.91086arXiv1812.03479OpenAlexW2900861343WikidataQ128818747 ScholiaQ128818747MaRDI QIDQ2008513

Nanrong He, Attila Szolnoki, Xiaojie Chen

Publication date: 26 November 2019

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.03479

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationmonitoringpunishmentcommon resourcereporting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (23)

Rewarding endowments lead to a win-win in the evolution of public cooperation and the accumulation of common resources ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in spatial threshold public goods game with the asymmetric return rate mechanism ⋮ Environmental feedback in spatial public goods game ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment ⋮ Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in dynamic networked systems with active striving mechanism ⋮ Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game ⋮ Effect of collective influence on the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ Rewards based on public loyalty program promote cooperation in public goods game ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in a conformity-driven evolving dynamic social network ⋮ Options for mobility and network reciprocity to jointly yield robust cooperation in social dilemmas ⋮ Governance of risky public goods under the threat of ostracism ⋮ The effects of resource limitation and consensual incentives on cooperation ⋮ Heterogeneous investment with dynamical feedback promotes public cooperation and group success in spatial public goods games ⋮ Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game ⋮ Reducing the bystander effect via decreasing group size to solve the collective-risk social dilemma ⋮ Effects of three-faced strategy on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma ⋮ Evolution of cooperation under pure institutional reward and punishment in collective-risk social dilemma games ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with pool exclusion strategies ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators ⋮ Mercenary punishment in structured populations ⋮ Heterogeneous donation game in geographical small-world networks ⋮ Emergency evacuation dynamics in complex configurations

Cites Work

• Environment promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial voluntary prisoner's dilemma game
• Promoting cooperation by punishing minority
• Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
• Mixed strategy under generalized public goods games
• Replicator dynamics for public goods game with resource allocation in large populations
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• The effect of the stake size on the evolution of fairness

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