On the tight security of TLS 1.3: theoretically sound cryptographic parameters for real-world deployments

DOI10.1007/S00145-021-09388-XzbMath1470.94082OpenAlexW3168670086WikidataQ114850017 ScholiaQ114850017MaRDI QIDQ2044755

Denis Diemert, Tibor Jager

Publication date: 10 August 2021

Published in: Journal of Cryptology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-021-09388-x

zbMATH Keywords

tightnesscryptographic protocolsprovable securitykey exchangetransport layer security

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Related Items (15)

Signed Diffie-Hellman key exchange with tight security ⋮ Authenticated key exchange and signatures with tight security in the standard model ⋮ Multipath TLS 1.3 ⋮ On the concrete security of TLS 1.3 PSK mode ⋮ On IND-qCCA security in the ROM and its applications. CPA security is sufficient for TLS 1.3 ⋮ Lattice-based signatures with tight adaptive corruptions and more ⋮ Key-schedule security for the TLS 1.3 standard ⋮ Cryptographic analysis of the Bluetooth secure connection protocol suite ⋮ Post-quantum anonymous one-sided authenticated key exchange without random oracles ⋮ Lattice-based authenticated key exchange with tight security ⋮ A cryptographic analysis of the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol ⋮ Tightly-secure authenticated key exchange, revisited ⋮ More efficient digital signatures with tight multi-user security ⋮ Signed (group) Diffie-Hellman key exchange with tight security ⋮ KEMTLS with delayed forward identity protection in (almost) a single round trip

Uses Software

• miTLS

Cites Work

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