Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and consensus

DOI10.1515/bejte-2019-0010OpenAlexW3174342411MaRDI QIDQ2099073

John D. Geanakoplos

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0010

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgespeculationagreementbetting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (9)

The value of information in risk-sharing environments with unawareness ⋮ Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs ⋮ The value of information under unawareness ⋮ The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces ⋮ Cognitive limits and preferences for information ⋮ Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures ⋮ Speculation under unawareness ⋮ Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors ⋮ Introduction to the special issue on unawareness

Cites Work

• Learning to agree
• Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
• The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• We can't disagree forever
• Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• A note on 'fulfilled expectations' equilibria
• Agreeing to disagree
• Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
• Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
• Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Expectations
• Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information
• On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations

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